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This  paper  reviews  arguments  and  empirical  findings  on  positive  effects  of  FDI  on  host 
country  firms.  With  the  exception  of  the  only  unambiguous  result  of  microeconometric 
studies, which is the superior productivity of foreign firms, the main conclusion extracted 
from empirical studies is the diversity of results. This diversity suggests that FDI will have 
different effects depending on the ‘technological congruence’ and ‘social capability’ of the 
host economy, as well as the familiarity of indigenous firms to products and technology of a 
given multinational corporation. 
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Multinational  Corporations  (MNCs)  and  Foreign  Direct  Investment  (FDI)  have  become  a 
much-discussed topic in recent years. The current wave of globalization on the one hand, and 
the worldwide-generalized wave of public sector intervention reform attracting investment to 
replace the public divestiture on the other, are among the main explanations for that increased 
attention. Both causes have carried out a rise in FDI importance as a source of investment 
funds for a growing number of countries (for the world as a whole, inward FDI flows as a 
percentage of Gross Fixed Capital Formation rose from 2.33 in 1970 to 9.45 in 2005, which 
represent an increase from $13,417 million to $916,277 million — UNCTAD, 2006)
1. But the 
alleged foremost reason is that FDI often involves the transfer of knowledge from one country 
to another (e.g., Carr et al., 2001), making it a potentially important vehicle for international 
diffusion of technology, as some theoretical models of foreign investment suggest (Caves, 
1974, 1996; Markusen, 1995).  
The favorable impacts predicted by theoretical models, and documented by some empirical 
studies, have been driving a considerable change in the attitude towards inward FDI over the 
last couple of decades, as most countries have liberalized their policies to attract investments 
from foreign MNCs. Accordingly, in the expectation that some of the knowledge brought by 
foreign  companies  may  spill  over to the receiving country’s domestic firms, governments 
across the world have lowered various entry barriers and opened up new sectors to foreign 
investment.  Furthermore,  an  increasing  number  of  national  governments  also  provide  a 
variety of forms of investment incentives to encourage foreign owned companies to invest in 
their countries.  
The  economic  explanation  for  offering  special  incentives  to  attract  FDI  derives  from  the 
frequent conviction that foreign investment produces positive externalities in the indigenous 
                                                 
1 Although most of FDI flows occur among industrialized nations, nowadays, the main source of international 
finance to developing countries is FDI.   3
firms and enhances host country’s economic growth
2. Romer (1993), for example, argues that 
there are significant ‘idea gaps’ between rich and poor countries, being foreign investment an 
important  instrument  in  transferring  technological  and  business  know-how  to  poorer 
countries, with substantial spillover effects for the poorer economy as a whole.  
The most common theoretical justification for the existence of positive externalities is that 
overseas  investors  possess  certain  advantages  that  local  firms  can  capture.  For  the  host 
country, these benefits derive from the accidental leakage of knowledge and technology to 
competing and unrelated firms as well as from the intentional development of forward and 
backward linkages between local and foreign firms. For example, local firms may learn with 
the practice of MNCs, or MNCs may transfer technology and know-how to local suppliers in 
order  to  improve  the  quality  of  inputs  (Rodriguez-Clare,  1996).  Alternatively,  local 
competitors  might  benefit  by  attracting  employees  with  firm-specific  knowledge  from  the 
foreign affiliate (Fosfuri et al., 2001). Local firms that are customers of the foreign affiliate 
may also benefit from the supply of more sophisticated intermediate inputs.  
However,  while  the  potential  importance  of  FDI  in  international  technology  diffusion  is 
widely recognized, the actual role FDI plays as a channel for technology diffusion in various 
contexts is still the subject of a significant debate and ongoing research efforts. Accordingly, 
it is time to survey the recent literature on the topic. We begin by exposing some theoretical 
arguments about the relationship between FDI and host country productivity and proceed with 
a review of the empirical literature. 
So, the remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the relationship 
between  FDI  and  productivity.  Beginning  with  the  reasons  that  explain  the  existence  of 
MNCs, the section goes on presenting the channels through which FDI enhances host country 
productivity  with  special  emphasis  on  spillovers.  The  distinction  between  horizontal  and 
vertical spillovers is also highlighted in what concerns the industrial organization, and the 
section ends with the role that the absorptive capacity plays in the international diffusion of 
technology. Section 3 reviews the empirical evidence about the effects of FDI on productivity 
of host-country firms. Because empirical tests are limited by the available data, we begin by 
considering the data used in empirical research. Before a short review of the case studies and 
of econometric analyses, we shall present the empirical evidence of the superior productivity 
of  foreign  firms  and  we  end  the  section  with  a  review  of  the  determinants  of  spillover 
                                                 
2 As it is well known, in absence of externalities, there is no reason for policy to differentiate between FDI and 
other forms of investment, including domestic investment.   4
magnitudes trying to answer the question: if spillovers exist, what determines its amplitude? 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FDI AND HOST COUNTRY PRODUCTIVITY 
2.1 Why does a firm become an MNC? 
The theory of FDI explains why a firm becomes an MNC using the OLI (ownership, location 
and  internalization)  paradigm  (see,  for  instance,  Dunning,  1977;  1981;  1988).  Given  that 
indigenous  firms  certainly  have  superior  knowledge  of  the  local  market,  consumer 
preferences,  and  business  practices,  the  MNC  candidate  must  enjoy  three  compensating 
advantages
3: i) it must possess ownership of some firm-specific tangible or intangible asset or 
skill that gives it a benefit over other firms (ownership advantage) — otherwise, it would not 
be able to overcome the additional costs of foreign production such as the costs of dealing 
with  foreign  administrations,  regulatory  and  tax  systems,  and  customer  preferences,  and 
would  become  non-competitive  in  comparison  with  indigenous  firms; ii) it  must be  more 
profitable to use these advantages in combination with at least some factor inputs located 
abroad  (locational  advantage)  —  if  not,  the  foreign  market  could  be  served  exclusively 
through exports; iii) it must be more beneficial for the firm to use or exploit the firm-specific 
asset itself than to sell them or lease and license them to other firms — for example, the firm-
specific asset might be a brand name or a non-patentable managerial skill or process, which 
the firm might find in its interest to keep internally instead of licensing (internalization)— in 
order to prevent the asset from being replicated by competitors. 
From an MNC viewpoint and respecting to internalization decision, both licensing and intra-
firm transfer of firm-specific assets have their advantages and disadvantages. For example, 
licensing to an independent firm will be convenient when the licensor lacks some assets other 
than  the  intangibles  which  are  required  for  FDI,  such  as  capital,  a  widespread  trade  and 
support network, and so on. Furthermore, licensing decreases the risks deriving from political 
changes in the host-country (for example expropriation), and it has a shorter lead-time than 
starting a subsidiary from the beginning. On the other hand, intra-firm transfer avoids any 
outflow of technology to other firms and it is more favorable than licensing when arms length 
transactions  are  complex  and  difficult  to  enforce.  Another  situation  in  which  intra-firm 
transfer is convenient with respect to licensing arises as a consequence of the transfer process 
                                                 
3 On compensating advantages, see also Graham and Krugman (1991)   5
itself, namely in the presence of no negligible transfer costs
4. But, as argued by Mansfield and 
Romeo (1980), in some cases MNCs transfer technologies of new vintages through direct 
investment  and  they  license  or  transfer their older  technologies  through  joint  ventures. A 
policy designed to attract FDI must have these points in consideration, because they mold the 
amount of incentives offered and the resulting effect on total factor productivity (TFP). 
In recent years theoretical approaches to FDI have turned to the possibility of the so-called 
‘technology sourcing’, that is, that FDI occurs not to exploit advantages generated in the 
home country, but to access technology that is created in the host country
5. Whereas it is 
likely  that,  in  a  given  host  region,  foreign-owned  corporations  may  not  be  the  most 
technologically advanced firms in a given sample, it is difficult to consider this hypothesis 
without the assumption that MNCs have other compensating advantages. Although this paper 
is focused on the effects of FDI on host country firms, and so it does not directly deal with 
‘technology sourcing’, one must recognize that the possibility of this hypothesis to occur 
makes it difficult to interpret the estimates from empirical tests of technology spillovers. 
 
2.2. Inflow of FDI and the flow of technology 
Broadly speaking, it is possible to identify three main channels through which inward FDI is 
thought to improve the productivity of a host-country: a) direct improvement in efficiency 
through the redirection of local resources towards more productive uses, including within 
purchased  firms;  b)  increase  in  domestic  market  competition;  and  c)  indirect  impact  via 
spillovers and other externalities associated with interactions between the foreign affiliate and 
the host country economy. All the three channels can contribute to reduce the substantial gaps 
existing between countries. 
Given the limited level of resources within the host economy, the entry of a foreign firm, 
whether  by  acquisition  or  physical  investment,  is  likely  to  be  associated  with  a  shift  of 
resources and effort away from a less productive activity. In this way, FDI is expected to 
make an increase in overall productivity within the economy possible. The dimension of the 
host country’s benefits depends on the action of a large bulk of linkages between foreign 
owner(s)  and  domestic  local  firms  and  customers,  as  well  as  on  the  effectiveness  of  the 
                                                 
4 Teece (1977) showed that transfer costs can be considerable and can in particular situations account for more 
than 20 per cent of the cost of developing the technology. 
5 Theoretical approaches to technology sourcing can be seen in Fosfuri and Motta (1999) or Siotis (1999). 
Driffield and Love (2003) test empirically the existence of technology sourcing for a panel of UK manufacturing 
industries.    6
foreign firm to prevent the potential gains to be totally transferred to the host country’s firms 
and  consumers.  Additionally,  a  foreign-owned  firm  may  contribute  directly  to  the 
productivity of domestic firms by lowering input costs, or by increasing the demand for inputs 
produced by local suppliers.  
The entrance of foreign affiliates is usually seen as a way of strengthening domestic market 
competition,  thereby  leading  eventually  to  higher  productivity,  lower  prices  and  more 
efficient resource allocation, but it can also lead to greater market concentration and to reduce 
domestic market competition. The risk of the latter is exacerbated not only if the entrant has 
an important international market position, if the barriers to entry into the industry are high, 
but also because of host country characteristics: either a small market or markets unconnected 
geographically, competition laws weak or weakly enforced (OECD, 2002). On the other hand, 
some international trade literature suggests that national welfare can be constricted by FDI 
inflows  if  MNCs  capture  market  share  from  indigenous  firms  and  reduce  the  latter’s 
supernormal profits (se for example, Krugman and Venables, 1995). 
So, the increase in domestic market competition is not always an assured outcome of the FDI 
entry, and where that outcome is achieved it can either decrease the productivity of domestic 
firms, as suggested by Aitken and Harrison (1999) and Konings (2001), or have positive 
effects, as noted by Kokko (1996) and Driffield (2001). In order to assess the existence and 
the dimension of direct and indirect effects of FDI on productivity, and in face of possible 
contradictory  effects  of  market  competition,  there  is  a  large  ground  for  empirical 
investigation, both at the micro and at the macro level. 
If  MNCs  use  a  higher  level  of  technology  and  technology,  or  knowledge,  has  some 
characteristics  of  public  goods  (Caves,  1996;  Markusen,  1995),  there  is  scope  for 
technological externalities and local firms to capture part of the advantages of the former 
through  spillovers  from  MNCs,  being  this  indirect  impact  rationalized  usually as positive 
externalities.  These  positive  externalities  may  be  associated  to  backward  and  forward 
linkages,  or  they  may  be  the  simple  resulting  effect  of  more  informal  mechanisms.  For 
example, MNCs may transfer cost-free technology and know-how to local suppliers in order 
to improve the quality of inputs (Rodriguez-Clare, 1996). Conversely, local firms may benefit 
from the acquisition of goods of superior quality produced by MNCs.  
 
   7
2.3. Spillovers 
Productivity  externalities  from  FDI  may  take  place  when  the  entry  or  presence  of 
multinational corporations increases the productivity of domestic firms in a host country, and 
the MNCs do not fully internalize the value of these benefits. This is the case when local 
firms improve their efficiency by copying technologies of foreign affiliates operating in the 
local market or merely by learning with the practice of MNCs, the so-called 'demonstration 
effect',  based  only  on  observation.  Complementarily,  indigenous  firms  may  benefit  from 
foreign  affiliate’s  embodied  firm-specific  knowledge  (Fosfuri  et  al.,  2001)  when  hiring 
workers trained by the foreign affiliates (Blomström and Kokko, 1998). These are knowledge 
spillovers in nature. Another kind of spillovers occurs if multinational entry leads to more 
severe competition in the host country market, which forces local firms to use their existing 
resources more efficiently or to search for new technologies
6.  
The  linkages  between  the  MNC  affiliate  and  its  local  suppliers  and  customers  offer  a 
particularly significant channel for spillovers. Lall (1980) identifies four interactions between 
MNCs and their suppliers that can help increase the productivity and efficiency of local firms: 
i) MNCs can help prospective suppliers to set up production facilities; ii) MNCs can have 
need of reliable, high quality products that are delivered on time, and so they provide the 
suppliers with technical assistance or information to help improve the products or facilitate 
innovations;  iii)  MNCs  can  make  available  training  and  help  in  management  and 
organization; and iv) MNCs can help suppliers to find additional customers including their 
sister affiliates in other countries, which offers some useful learning to start to exporting to 
other independent external purchasers.  
The linkages between the MNCs and indigenous firms allow the division between horizontal 
and  vertical  spillovers.  This  distinction  is  important  because  if  MNCs  try  to  prevent 
technology leakage and spillovers from taking place, the MNCs behavior may be different in 
face of each one of them. In general, this goal can be achieved through diverse ways: formal 
protection of their intellectual property, trade secrecy, paying higher wages or locating in 
countries characterized by limited imitative capacities of their domestic firms. Of course, to 
prevent the occurrence of spillovers through these instruments is much easier in the case of 
horizontal spillovers. If there are horizontal productivity spillovers, the presence of MNCs 
                                                 
6  This  distinction  must  be  made  for  policy  purposes  because  knowledge  spillovers  present  a  rationale  for 
government action to subsidise FDI inflows, and such rationale is absent when the improved productivity of 
local firms is due to increased competition.   8
leads  to  productivity  increases  in  domestic  firms  of  the  same  industry,  allowing  them  to 
become more efficient
7. In case of vertical spillovers, that is, productivity spillovers that take 
place due to linkages between foreign firms and their local suppliers
8 it may be impossible to 
prevent the action of positive externalities.  
 
2.4. Impact of FDI on host country industrial organization 
Theoretical  literature  about  the  impact  of  FDI  on  host-country  industrial  organization  has 
shown that FDI spillovers are more likely to operate at the inter-industry rather than at the 
intra-industry level. Since the MNC can benefit from knowledge diffusion when it reaches 
downstream  clients  and  upstream  suppliers,  it  will  encourage  vertical  flows  of  generic 
knowledge leading to inter-industry spillovers. Consequently, linkages can be a propagation 
mechanism  for  technological  externalities  above  and  beyond  the  pecuniary  externalities 
highlighted by Hirschman (1977).  
This body of literature shows that it is in the interest of the MNC to minimize the likelihood 
of imitation, particularly under imperfect intellectual property rights in the host-country. In 
this case, trade secrecy and efficiency wages are usually used to lessen technology leakage 
from FDI. Additionally, MNC can organize production in order to maximize the imitation lag 
if the intra-industry spillovers are likely to materialize the dissipation of technical knowledge 
rents  (Ethier  and Markusen,  1996).  On  the other  hand,  the  vertically  integrated  nature of 
MNCs  (Helpman,  1984)  can  be  a  reply  to  the  economies  of  scale  arising  from  product-
specific R&D. Also, in the presence of incomplete contracts environment, MNC minimize 
transaction costs with inside transfer of resource and information (Ethier, 1986). The location 
of the MNC subsidiary is also selected in order to minimize rent erosion due to imitation by 
local firms. Since the closeness to potential competitors (either with absorptive capacity or 
with capacity to reverse engineering of proprietary technology) would be detrimental to the 
MNC, it locates subsidiaries where potential competitors cannot wear away its market share 
(Markusen and Venables, 1998).  
                                                 
7 According to Blomström and Kokko (1998) productivity spillovers can occur through three main channels. 
First,  as  a  consequence  of  movements  of  highly  skilled  staff  from  MNCs  to  domestic  firms.  Second,  as 
‘demonstration effects’ if there are arm's-length relationships between MNCs and host country firms and the 
latter learn superior production technologies from the former. Third, as 'competition effect' if competition from 
MNCs force domestic rivals to update production techniques and other technologies in order to become more 
productive. 
8 For the several forms of operation of vertical spillovers see Smarzynska (2004)   9
Traditionally, trade theory has emphasized the change in the utilization of the host-country 
factor endowment that improves allocative efficiency. Likewise, some of the literature on 
backward linkages calls attention to the static effect of the increased demand by the MNC for 
local intermediate inputs (Rivera-Batiz and Rivera-Batiz, 1990). But, the impact of FDI goes 
beyond the type of static effect traditionally emphasized, and may include improvements in 
technical  efficiency,  as  it  is highlighted  in  some  more  recent  models, where  the dynamic 
effect on host-country productivity results of both the demand and supply of intermediate 
inputs and services (Markusen and Venables, 1999). In these models, not only do incumbent 
upstream sector producers benefit but also the MNC may start providing goods or services 
that were previously unavailable in the host-country. Thus, MNC operations can induce local 
availability  of  new  intermediate  services  and  inputs,  and  in  that  way  to  elucidate  the 
relationship  between  FDI  penetration  and  growth  in  the  productivity  of  downstream 
manufacturers  (Romer,  1994;  Rodriguez-Clare,  1996).  So,  one  can  expect  an  increase  in 
specialization of downstream local firms and a direct inducement on demand of upstream 
sectors, as the result of the supply of new intermediate inputs with a consequent recovery of 
productivity (Kugler, 2006). 
The capacity  to transform the  potential  benefits of FDI in actual impacts depends on the 
market structure in the host-country. When demand in the host-country is inelastic because of 
reduced  availability  of  substitute  goods,  FDI  yields  higher  rents  for  the  MNC  as  local 
presence  facilitates  market  penetration.  Then,  limited  domestic  competition  relative  to 
international  competition  means  that  FDI  is  more  profitable  to  the  MNC.  Furthermore, 
competition  from  imports  limits  the  attractiveness  of  imitation  for  domestic  enterprises 
(Bardhan, 1982). Other things equal, the MNC will seek to set up subsidiaries in countries in 
which the market structure yields less direct competition within its industry but in which 
upstream sectors are competitive. Hence, FDI will be associated with situations in which there 
are  few  direct  competitors  and  many  input  suppliers  resulting  in  limited  intra-industry 
spillovers but a positive impact at the inter-industry level. 
So, the abovementioned models imply that inter-industry positive externalities to host-country 
producers are much more likely than intra-industry gains in productivity. From the MNC 
viewpoint, technological spillovers ‘represent a benefit when they diffuse downstream and 
upstream but a loss when they diffuse inside the subsidiary’s industry’ (Kugler, 2006, p. 448). 
This  has a consequence in the location decision: the subsidiary will be installed so as to   10
minimize  horizontal  spillovers  of  industry-specific  know  how  to  competitors  while 
encouraging vertical flows of generic knowledge to complementary sectors.  
 
2.5. Absorptive capacity 
The  occurrence  of  knowledge  spillovers  is  not  an  automatic  outcome  of  the  presence  of 
MNCs’ affiliates in a host country. Although Findlay (1978), as well as other authors of the 
‘technological catching up theory’ (e.g., Abramovitz, 1979, 1986), suggests that the greater 
the distance between two economies in terms of development, the greater the accumulation of 
available opportunities to take advantage of in the less advanced economy
9, it is well accepted 
that the assimilation of the knowledge spillovers is so much larger as the absorptive capacity 
would be. In fact, the technological ‘gap’ affects the growth potential, but there are two sorts 
of constraints to the growth potential of a laggard economy: the limitations of ‘technological 
congruence’ and its ‘social capability’
10.  
The limitations of technological congruence arise because the frontiers of technology advance 
in an unbalanced and biased way. The evolution of technology reflects the direct influence of 
past  science  and  technology  on  the  evolution  of  useful  knowledge  but  also  the  complex 
adaptation  of  that  evolution  to  factor  availabilities,  as  well  as  to  the  scale  of  markets, 
consumer  demands  and  technical  capabilities  of  those  relatively  advanced  economies 
operating at or near the frontiers of technology (David, 1975)
11. It can simply happen that the 
resource  availabilities,  factor  supplies,  technical  capabilities,  market  scales  and  consumer 
demands in laggard countries do not conform well to those required by the technologies and 
organizational arrangements that have emerged in the leading economy or economies. These 
may  render  it  extremely  difficult  if  not  prohibitively  costly,  for  firms,  industries,  and 
economies  to  switch  quickly  from  an  already  established  technological  regime,  with  its 
associated trajectory of technical development, to exploit a quite distinct technological regime 
that  had  emerged  elsewhere,  under  a  different  constellation  of  economic  and  social 
conditions. 
On the other hand, the ‘social capability’ of a country is dependent on: i) its level of general 
education and technical competence; ii) its institutions (industrial, commercial and financial) 
                                                 
9 That is, they can employ technologies elsewhere in use without the cost of inventing them. 
10 The expression ‘social capability’ was first used by Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1972). 
11 See David (1975, Ch. 1) for an introduction to the theory of ‘localized’ technological progress and its relation 
to the global bias of factor-augmenting technical change, as well as for a synthesis of some of the relevant 
historical evidence.   11
and their skills to support and operate modern, large-scale business; and iii) its political and 
social  characteristics  that  influence  the  risks,  the  incentives,  and  the  personal  rewards  of 
economic activity, including those rewards in social appreciation that go beyond money and 
wealth. So, one of the main determinants of 'social capability’, but not the only one, which 
influences the ‘absorptive capacity’ of a laggard country is the level of a country’s human 
capital, as emphasized by the seminal paper of Nelson and Phelps (1966). 
Building on Nelson and Phelps (1966), several authors (for example, Cohen and Levinthal, 
1989) have argued that human capital plays a dual role in promoting TFP growth: first, it 
enables a country to directly influence productivity by determining the capacity to innovate; 
second,  a  higher  level  of  human  capital  increases  the  capacity  of  an  economy  to  absorb 
foreign  technology  allowing  a  country  to  close  the  gap  between  the  existing  level  of 
productivity and that of the leading country faster. So, a more highly educated workforce can 
better not only render FDI more fruitful for foreign investors, but also take advantage of 
foreign  R&D-induced  ideas  and  use  capital  goods  imports  (embodying  advanced  foreign 
technologies) more effectively. 
From  the  above  said,  countries  and  firms  may  take  advantages  of  their  backwardness, 
although  the  restraints  highlighted  make  the  importance  of  relative  backwardness  in 
technology  absorption  empirically  controversial  if  such  restrictions  are  not  controlled. 
Perhaps  because  of  failure  in  controlling  all  the  above-mentioned  restraints,  explanations 
differ for the significance of the ‘gap’. While Findlay (1978) identifies the ‘gap’ with the 
pressure for change, that is, the rate of the technological externality from FDI is an increasing 
function of the technology gap, expressing the idea that the greater the distance between two 
economies in terms of development, the greater the pressure for change and the faster the 
assimilation of new technology is
12, Glass and Saggi (1998) argue that the larger the gap, the 
lower the quality of the technology transferred and, consequently, the lower the potential for 
spillovers is. On the other hand, Lapan and Bardhan (1973) highlight a certain precedence 
between  opportunities  and  absorptive  capacity  —  firms  must  have  a  certain  absorptive 
capacity  before  they  can  profit  from  new  technologies  discovered  elsewhere.  So,  the 
controversial predictions make the need for empirical evidence mandatory to help inform the 
design of more effective inward investment promotion policies. 
 
                                                 
12 In the same line, the model of Wang and Blomström (1992) predicts a positive relationship between the degree 
of spillovers from FDI and the size of the technology gap between foreign and domestic firms.   12
 
3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
3.1. Introduction 
There is an extensive literature on the mechanisms by which the inflow of FDI enhances the 
flow of technology across frontiers. However, the bulk of academic debates about the possible 
role of inward investment refer to the spread of superior technology from foreign affiliates to 
host country firms. Theories of the effect of FDI on host countries have generally assumed 
that the former own superior technology and that some of that technological knowledge spills 
over to the latter economy.  
Additionally, it is usually also assumed that there is some automatic mechanism which rules 
the spread of technology. For instance, Findlay (1978) assumed that the rate of change of 
technical efficiency in host country firms is an increasing function of the comparative extent 
to which the activities of foreign firms pass through the local economy. On the other hand, the 
assumption that positive effects of FDI are carried by technology is not unquestionable, since 
the effects of MNCs over host country productivity are more extensive. All these assumptions 
offer  fertile  ground  for  empirical  tests.  But,  empirical  tests  are  obviously  limited  by  the 
available data. So we begin by a comment on available FDI data and on the way data restrict 
empirical research. Some questions guide the subsequent analysis in this section. Do foreign 
owned firms present higher productivity than domestically owned ones? Does some of that 
difference spill over to other firms either in the same or in other industries? 
There are two general types of data concerning foreign direct investment. One is the financial 
data from balance of payments accounting. These data show evidence of inward and outward 
flows of direct investment and the resulting stocks. The second type of data concerns the 
actions of FDI affiliates in their host countries and the actions of their parents in their home 
countries. Actions could include their sales, production, employment, wages, assets, R&D 
workforce  and  R&D  outlays  and  expenditures  for  plant  and  equipment.  None  of  these 
characteristics  are  revealed  by  the  financial  data  from  the  balance-of-payments.  They  are 
obtained  from  surveys  of  parent  companies,  in  their  home  countries,  or,  from  surveys  of 
affiliates,  in  their  host  countries,  often  by  identifying  foreign-owned  establishments  in 
economic censuses. 
These two types of data are usually associated to two broad approaches to the investigation of 
the effects of FDI, covering two related but different sets of subjects or activities, explained   13
by different theories and by different branches of economics. The first might be denoted as 
the  industrial  organization,  or  micro,  view.  The  second  might  be  referred  to  as  the 
international finance, or macro, view. The micro view was the first in order of emergence and 
it is the one that deals with the large majority of studies. It tries to explain the motivations for 
locating  the  investment  abroad  from  the  viewpoint  of  the  investor.  It  also  looks  at  the 
consequences to the investor, and to home and host countries, of the MNCs’ actions and/or of 
the affiliates created by these investments. These consequences arise from their employment, 
production, trade, and their flows and stocks of intellectual capital. These motivations and 
consequences are intrinsically related both to the control of the affiliates by investing firms 
and to the ability of the MNCs in coordinating the activities of parents and affiliates.  
On the other hand, the macro view sees FDI as a particular form of the flow of capital across 
national borders, from home countries to host countries, measured in Balance of Payments 
Statistics. Those flows generate a specific form of stocks of capital in host countries, namely 
the value of home country investment in entities, typically corporations, controlled by a home 
country owner, or in which a home country owner holds a certain share of voting rights. In 
this view, the interest is focused on the flow of financial capital, on the value of the stock of 
capital  that  is  accumulated  by  the  investing  firms,  and  on  the  flows  of  income  from  the 
investments. 
 
3.2.  The  micro  view.  Comparisons  of  productivity  between  foreign-owned  and 
domestically-owned firms 
As we have seen in section 2, much of the literature on comparisons of productivity between 
foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms intend to answer the question of whether there 
are spillovers to domestic firms, but that question itself implies the prospect that foreign firms 
are more efficient, and thus that there is some productivity advantage that might spill over to 
domestic firms. So a first question arises: Do foreign owned firms present higher productivity 
than domestically owned ones?  
Table  1  summarizes  the  results  of  various  studies  about  differences  in  value  added  and 
different  measures  of  productivity  between  foreign  owned  and  host  country  plants  in 
developing countries.  
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Table 1. 














Value added, and gross output per worker, is more 
than twice as high in MNCs-owned plants overall 
than in private domestic plants, and higher in each 








The  estimated  technology  differences  were  found 
higher  in  the  foreign-owned  establishments  in  26 










Labor productivity is higher in establishments with 
foreign  equity  than  in  purely  domestically  owned 
companies. 
 




Value added per worker, was about twice as high 
on average in foreign firms than in domestic firms. 
 
Haddad and Harrison 
(1993)  
1985-89 
Morocco  Output per worker is higher, in foreign-owned firms 
than in domestically owned firms in 12 out of 18 
industries. 
 
Harrison (1996)   Morocco and 
Venezuela 
Joint  ventures  exhibit  higher  productivity  levels 
than their domestic counterparts. 
 
Okamoto and Sjöholm 
(1999) 
 





Higher  foreign  shares  of  gross  output  than  of 
employment  in  almost  every  industry.  An 
implication of this finding is that labor productivity 
was higher in the foreign owned plants. 
 
Kathuria (2000) 
From 1975-76  
to 1988-89 
Indian firms in 
26 manufacturing 
industries  
In  13  of  the  26  industries,  a  foreign  firm  is  the 
technological  leader, and in 15 industries, foreign 
firms are, on average, more efficient. 
 






firms in Taiwan 
Labor  productivity  is  significantly  higher  in 
foreign-owned  manufacturing  firms  than  in 
domestically owned firms. 
 
Ramstetter (1999) 
15-20 year periods 
Five East Asian 
countries 
Value added per worker was higher in the foreign-







Foreign-owned plants had higher productivity than 
domestically  owned  plants,  even  when  various 
elements  of  the  production  function  are  taken 
account  of,  and  higher  level  of  productivity 
persisted through a variety of statistical tests of the 
regressions. 
 
There have been less examinations of the productivity of foreign-owned and domestically 
owned firms within developed countries, despite their large share of direct investment. Table   15
















Comparing output per man-year in a sample of U S 
affiliates  with  that  in  the  average  U  K  firm 
(including the affiliates) in 10 industrial groups and 
concludes US affiliates’ productivity was higher in 
every one 
 
Dunning and Rowan 
(1970) 
US and UK-
owned firms in 
the U K 
 
Greater efficiency in the US- owned firms 










Foreign-owned plants have higher labor productivity 
than domestically owned ones.  
 





Foreign-owned  plants  were  superior  to  the  US-
owned plants of non-multinational firms, even large 
firms, in both labor productivity and TFP. 
 
Conyon et al. (1999)  United Kingdom 
ARD 
Acquisitions  of  UK  firms  by  foreigners  led  to 
increases in their profitability. 
 






Foreign-  owned  firms  in  the  U  K  had  labor 
productivity  about  10  per  cent  above  that  for 
domestically owned firms and TFP about 5 per cent 
higher.  Labor  and  total  factor  productivity  growth 
rates in foreign-owned plants were higher by about 1 
and 1/2 per cent per year. 
 
 
As is apparent from the above tables, the evidence on productivity, whatever the measure, is 
close to unanimous on the higher productivity of foreign-owned plants in both developed and 
developing countries. But, what are the reasons for such difference in productivity?  
Several authors attributed some of that higher productivity, to higher capital intensity or larger 
scale of production in the foreign-owned plants (Blomström and Wolff, 1994; Sjöholm, 1999; 
Chuang and Lin 1999; Howenstine and Zeile, 1994; Harris and Robinson, 2002). But, other 
comparisons of productivity between foreign and domestic plants, such as that by Griffith 
(1999), suggest that there is a total factor productivity component in the foreign productivity   16
differential,  although  the  determinants  of  this  remain  unexplored.  Griffith  and  Simpson 
(2004) show that foreign firms have higher levels of skill intensity than domestic firms, and 
therefore that their productivity is higher. 
Additionally,  Girma  (2005b)  studied  foreign  acquisitions  in  the  U.K.  manufacturing, 
combining propensity score-matching techniques with difference-in-differences analysis and 
found  that  on  average  acquisition  FDI  originating  from  the  U.S.  and  Europe  causes  an 
increase in total factor productivity. Since these two regions are the major sources of foreign 
take-over activity in the UK, he concluded: ‘as far its direct productivity effect is concerned, 
the recent wave  of  acquisition FDI has been largely beneficial’ (p. 185). Noteworthy the 
relationship found is not linear: the rate of technology transfer from foreign multinationals 
increases with the absorptive capacity of the firms which are object of take-over up to some 
critical point, beyond which it starts to decline. 
There are some opposite views to explain the superior MNC productivity. While Howenstine 
and Zeile (1994) attribute the within-industry differences to plant size, capital intensity, and 
employee skill level — rather than foreign ownership per se, Doms and Jensen (1998) find 
multinationality  of  the  firm  to  be  strongly  associated  to  productivity  levels,  beyond  the 
association with size and other plant characteristics. Additionally, Driffield and Taylor (2005) 
identify  differences  in  technology  intensity  across  different  nationalities  of  foreign  firms 
relative to their UK counterparts.  
On the other hand, Harris and Robinson (2002) provide another explanation for the higher 
productivity of MNC affiliates when compared with its domestic counterparts. These authors, 
analyzing the UK ARD data, show that plants sold by UK firms to foreign firms in 1982-1986 
or 1987-1992 were more productive, than plants sold by one UK firm to another. They also 
argue that the plants sold by domestic firms to foreign ones had much higher capital/labor 
ratios than those changing domestic owners. So the authors observe that plant turnover in 
general  seemed  to  involve  relatively  productive  plants  and  conclude  that  foreign  firms 
selected  relatively  high  productivity  plants  for  acquisition.  The  conclusions  of  the  above 
quoted  papers  bring  to  light  the  need  to  empirically  test  many  of  the  currently  used 
assumptions,  specifically  the  importance  of  firm  level  characteristics  in  technology  and 
productivity studies. However, the main question is: Does the superior productivity of foreign 
owned enterprises spill over to other firms?    17
As  was  clarified  in  the  preceding  section,  there  could  be  effects  of  FDI  on  productivity 
without the presence of spillovers. However, the empirical literature on growth effects of FDI, 
both  at  an  industry  level  and  at  a  firm  or  plant  level,  relies  almost  exclusively  on  the 
occurrence of spillovers from foreign owned to domestically owned firms (see the surveys of 
Blomström and Kokko, 1998; Lipsey, 2002; Saggi, 2002; and Görg and Greenaway, 2004). 
Until recently, partly due to data limitations, empirical evidence on FDI spillovers was made 
up of case studies. 
 
3.3. Case studies 
Case studies are specially useful in describing the interactions between multinationals and 
host country players, such as the particular forms assumed by technical assistance, control of 
quality, management training, and organization of the production process that are key aspects 
of the relationship of MNCs with their local suppliers (Moran 2001). The cases studied by 
Mansfield  and  Romeo  (1980)  and  Rhee  and  Belot  (1990)  for  example,  illustrate  various 
channels  through  which  spillovers  are  assumed  to  occur,  with  a  particular  emphasis  on 
technology transfer to domestic firms. Case studies have also documented the importance of 
local  skills  and  in-house  technological  capacity  to  adapt  and  use  techniques  developed 
elsewhere (Lall, 1992; Evenson and Westphal, 1995). 
This research emphasizes usually linkages, labor turnover and demonstration effects. But case 
studies are also illustrative of the mechanisms whereby MNC entry and presence can affect 
industrial sectors in the host-country. The changes in the automotive industry in Mexico and 
in the electronics/computer industry in Asia are illustrative examples of the transformations 
pushed by inward FDI. Both in the Mexican case and in the Asian one the foreign direct 
presence was crucial in transforming the local structure of production, based on small-scale 
plants producing mostly for the undersized domestic market, into a dynamic export-led sector 
with prosperous locally owned exporter firms of parts and accessories. In both cases, this 
result was partly due to the introduction of industry best practices resulting from the contacts 
between foreigner investors and their local suppliers and to the technical assistance provided 
by the former to the latter
13.  
In  general,  case  studies  have  revealed  significant  positive  externalities  from  FDI.  For 
example,  Larrain  et  al.  (2000)  show  substantial  spillover  benefits  for  the  local  economy 
                                                 
13 For a more complete picture of both cases, see Lim (2001) and the references therein.    18
generated by Intel’s investment in Costa Rica in 1997 (specifically, creating new training 
programs  in  higher  education  institutions;  producing  important  signaling  effects  on  other 
investors;  and  attracting  new  suppliers  to  Costa  Rica)
14.  Although  the  picture  that  has 
emerged from the case study literature has been important in guiding progress in the theory of 
FDI, the evidence from case studies is inconclusive. On the one hand it is, at best, mixed. On 
the other hand, case studies do not always offer quantitative information and do not easily 
generalize. The mixed nature of evidence can frequently be seen. For example, Rhee and 
Belot (1990) suggest that foreign entrants led to the creation of booming domestic textile 
industries in Mauritius and Bangladesh. In contrast, Mansfield and Romeo (1980) surveyed 
26 US-based MNCs and reported that in only a few cases had FDI accelerated the access of 
local competitors to new technology. Likewise, the conclusion about Intel’s investment in 
Costa Rica made by Hanson (2001) is very different from the one of Larrain et al. (2000). In 
face of the drawbacks of case studies, the research is usually based on industry-level and 
micro-level studies, and is done through statistic analyses searching horizontal and vertical 
productivity spillovers, using either cross-section in former analysis or panel data in more 
recent studies.  
 
3.4. Statistical analysis 
3.4.1. Efficiency spillovers  
Is the productivity of domestically owned firms positively related to the presence of foreign 
firms? Early efforts to carry out econometric tests of FDI spillovers were constrained because 
researchers  only  had  access  to  cross-section  data.  In  the  earlier  empirical  literature,  the 
explanatory  variables  usually  included  capital  intensity,  skill  capacity,  and  the  scale  of 
operations,  apart  from  nationality  of  ownership.  This  is  the  case  of  two  groundbreaking 
studies  searching  for  intra-industry  spillovers  in  Australia  (Caves,  1974)  and  Canada 
(Globerman, 1975). They estimated sectoral production functions, with the share of foreign 
firms as an explanatory variable and have found, in both cases, that the productivity of the 
host-country firms and the productivity of foreign firms were positively correlated
15. 
                                                 
14 Other examples include a case study of three electronics investors in Singapore (Lim and Fong, 1982); a case 
study  of the  investments  of General  Motors  and  Ford  in  Brazil  and the  investment  of  Intel in Costa Rica 
(Hanson, 2001); and a survey of 72 senior managers in Kenyan manufacturing firms (Gershenberg, 1987).  
15 Blomström and Persson (1983) have found the same pattern in the Mexican data.   19
Subsequently, Kokko (1994) analyzing the Mexican manufacturing in 1970 and Kokko et al. 
(1996)  dealing  with  the  Uruguayan  micro  data  in  1990  found  that  there  is  a  positive 
correlation between foreign presence and local productivity only in sectors where the market 
share of foreign firms is small. This fact was interpreted as evidence that a wide technology 
gap between local manufacturers and foreign firms, hold back externalities from FDI to occur. 
This  research  also  found  a  negative  correlation  between  high  barriers  to  entry  and  the 
motivations to transfer modern technology. Blomstrom et al. (1994) found that in consumer 
goods industries, with relatively low capital and low technological intensity, MNCs install 
more advanced technologies to overcome the disadvantages of their foreign condition, since 
the way for MNCs to surpass competitors is to keep one step ahead. So, the authors conclude 
that a more competitive local market structure helps the potential for spillovers due to the 
increase in technology flows.  
As we may see in table 3 and table 4, which summarize evidence on FDI efficiency spillovers 
for developed and developing countries, respectively, the evidence is not conclusive. 
 
Table 3.  
Evidence on efficiency spillovers in developed countries 
Positive  Country  Negative or inconclusive  Country 
Caves (1974)  Australia  Girma et al. (2001)  UK 
Globerman (1979)  Canada  Girma and Wakelin (2001)  UK 
Liu et al. (2000)   UK  Harris and Robinson (2004)  UK 
Driffield (2001)  UK  Girma and Wakelin (2002)  UK 
Haskel et al. (2002)  UK  Girma and Görg (2002)  UK 
Ruane and Ugur (2002)  Ireland  Girma (2005a)  UK 
Görg and Strobl (2003)  Ireland  Barrios and Strobl (2002)  Spain 
Castellani and Zanfei (2002)  Italy  Castellani and Zanfei (2002)  Spain 
Keller and Yeaple (2003)  US  Castellani and Zanfei (2002)  France 
 
 
Table 4.  
Evidence on efficiency spillovers in developing countries 
Positive  Country  Negative or inconclusive  Country 
Blomström and Persson (1983)  Mexico  Haddad and Harrison (1993)  Morocco 
Blomström (1986)  Mexico  Kokko et al. (1996)  Uruguay 
Blomström and Wolf (1994)  Mexico  Harrison (1996)  Venezuela 
Kokko (1994)  Mexico  Aitken and Harrison (1999)  Venezuela 
Kokko (1996)  Mexico  Harrison (1996)  Morocco 
Aitken et al. (1997)  Mexico  Kathuria (2000)  India 
Blomstrom et al. (1994)  Uruguay  Kokko et al. (2001)  Uruguay 
Blomström and Sjöholm (1999)  Indonesia  López-Córdova (2002)  Mexico 
Sjöholm (1999)  Indonesia  Kugler (2006)  Colombia 
Chuang and Lin (1999)  Taiwan     
Görg and Strobl (2002)  Ghana       20
 
As it is apparent from the tables even though the number of studies is high, the number of 
countries where the spillovers are searched is fairly smaller. But another possible conclusion 
emerges  from  the  tables:  at  the  beginning  the  limited  evidence  available,  particularly  in 
developed  countries,  seems  to  indicate  somewhat  consistently  that  the  productivity  of 
domestically owned firms was positively related to the presence of foreign firms but, in more 
recent times, other studies are much more pessimistic about such relationship. However, as 
was concluded by Blomström and Kokko (1998) there has never been a strong consensus on 
the associated magnitudes.  
The early econometric literature, which used no more than cross-section data, was important 
as a first approximation to quantify the mechanisms documented in case studies. However, 
the conclusions that can be drawn in these studies, based solely on contemporary effects have 
severe limitations. Since technological diffusion is essentially a dynamic phenomenon, more 
recent studies have provided dynamic analysis based on panel data, at the same time as panel 
data have replaced cross-section data. 
The  literature  on  horizontal  and  vertical  spillovers  was  recently  surveyed  by  Görg  and 
Greenaway (2004). These authors analyzed 42 studies on horizontal productivity spillovers in 
manufacturing industries in developed, developing and transition economies, being 16 with 
cross-sectional data and 26 with panel data. In the 26 studies which employ panel data, justly 
the most appropriate estimating framework (see, Görg and Strobl, 2003), surveyed by Görg 
and  Greenaway  (2004)  only  eight  studies  find  unambiguously  positive  evidence  and  are 
almost all of them for developed countries, seven show evidence of negative effects of MNCs 
on host-country firms and the remainder present mixed or statistically insignificant results
16.  
As it is shown by the literature on the strategy of optimal market penetration, MNCs have 
usually not the same interest in spillovers at the intra-industry level that they have at the inter-
industry  level.  However,  the  higher  expected  propensity  for  inter-industry  effects  has  not 
deserved  the  center  stage  in  empirical  research  about  the  impact  of  FDI  on  host-country 
manufacturing. Görg and Greenaway (2004) also surveyed studies on vertical spillovers and 
                                                 
16 Among the studies employing panel data that report unambiguous positive FDI effects the vast majority is 
related to developed countries: the US (Keller and Yeaple, 2003); the UK (Liu et al., 2000; Haskel et al., 2002); 
Ireland (Görg, and Strobl, 2003); the US and Sweden (Braconier et al., 2005); the US and Japan (Branstetter, 
2006). In contrast, studies using firm level panel data find evidence of negative effects only in developing 
countries or transition economies: Bulgaria (Konings, 2001); Czech Republic (Djankov and Hoekman, 2000); 
Venezuela (Aitken and Harrison, 1999), for instance. This calls the attention to the level of development as an 
important factor in making possible or obstructing the appearance of FDI impacts.    21
among the five studies using panel data only two indicate positive and statistically significant 
results: the one of Smarzynska (2004) with evidence for backward spillovers and the other 
made by Driffield et al. (2002) searching for forward spillovers. 
Görg and Greenaway are tending to point the variety of findings on spillovers mainly to the 
difference between cross-section and panel data studies. A more formal ‘meta-analysis’ of 
spillover findings from 21 studies by Görg and Strobl (2001), using the t-statistic in spillover 
equations as the dependent variable, concluded that the use of cross-section data was a strong 
positive influence. Of the eight studies that used panel data, four found significant negative 
spillovers, confirming the importance of the distinction between panel data and cross-section 
results. However, there are many other differences that may be important explanations for this 
diversity of results: firms vary in their capabilities, industries have different characteristics, 
and there can be differences among countries in both capabilities and policies. 
Görg and Greenaway conclude: The evidence on spillovers reported in their survey ‘is mixed 
at best’ (p. 188). More recent studies do not provide sufficient evidence that can modify this 
statement;  however  a  trend  in  recent  studies  is  noteworthy:  absence  of  intra-industry 
spillovers consistent with the presence of inter-industry externalities has been highlighted, as 
for instance in Bwalya (2006) and Kugler (2006). 
 
3.4.2. Evidence from panel data 
Recent development in data availability has allowed the possibility of econometric testing on 
spillovers.  The  empirical  framework  to  assess  FDI  spillovers  usually  utilizes  a  constant 
returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function specified as:  
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where y is the logarithm of labor productivity (output per worker), β is the vector of input 
share parameters to be estimated, x is the vector of logarithms of inputs except labor (e.g., 
total  cost  of materials, service value of physical capital stock), i and t are firm and time 
subscripts, and m denotes the number of production inputs.  i v  controls for unobserved firm-
specific effects and  it u  is the usual equation error term. Some authors include in equation (1)   22
the lagged logarithm of output — 1 − it y — to control for adjustments to demand shocks as well 
as to explain part of the serial correlation in the equation error (Bwalya, 2006). In this case, α 
may be interpreted as the speed of adjustment to long-run output following a production or 
demand shock. In the empirical tests two productivity spillovers variables,  H S  (horizontal 
spillovers),  v S  (vertical spillovers) are then included in the model to estimate their effects on 
productivity
17. So, the full augmented Cobb-Douglas production function is stated in its first 
difference as: 
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Where  H S   intends  to  capture  horizontal  (intra-industry)  productivity  spillovers  and  it  is 
usually defined as a ratio of labor employed by foreign firms to total labor in the sector.  V S , a 
proxy for vertical spillovers, may be calculated (as in Smarzynska, 2004) as the proportion of 
output produced by downstream sectors and supplied to upstream sectors weighted by the 
share of foreign employment (or sales) to total employment (sales) in the industry.  
As stated in the previous section, foreign presence can raise the productivity of local firms 
through technology diffusion, measured by horizontal (intra-industry) spillovers from foreign 
firms  to  local  firms  and  by  linkages  with  local  firms  in  downstream  or  upstream  sectors 
(vertical spillovers). Foreign presence can also induce greater competition in both the product 
and factor markets, thereby forcing domestic firms to back up their average cost curves and 
reduce capacity utilization and productivity or even to lead to the end of the activity of some 
host-country  firms.  But  the  increased  competition  can  also  help  provide  incentives  for 
domestic firms to become more innovative and productive, and thereby raise efficiency within 
the  industry.  These  two  effects  are  expected  to  exert  a  negative  and  positive  impact, 
respectively,  on  domestic  firm  productivity.  If  positive  productivity  effects  occur,  either 
through horizontal spillovers or backward and forward linkages, the overall effect of FDI on 
the productivity of local firms will be positive. The actual overall impact will depend on the 
relative magnitude of benefits generated through intra-industry spillovers and inter-industry 
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linkages. As such, the expected sign on δ and γ in equation (2) cannot be established a priori 
and so there it is large ground for empirical investigation. 
In general, the first panel studies about FDI spillovers in less developed countries fail to find 
positive intra-industry productivity effects from panel data of manufacturing plants. This is 
the case of Haddad and Harrison (1993) for Morocco, Harrison (1996) for Cote d’Ivoire, 
Aitken  and  Harrison  (1999)  for  Czech  Republic,  and  Djankov  and  Hoekman  (2000)  for 
Venezuela. These studies revealed an empirical pattern — the ‘enclave’ situations — where 
increases in the market share of foreign firms are harmful to host-country producers in the 
same industry. However, these studies have a noteworthy failure: none of them consider the 
empirical hypothesis of inter-industry externalities in its econometric framework. If the true 
econometric model is the one of equation (2), the estimates of the above studies suffer from 
an omitted variable bias with the usual consequences: the OLS estimators of the variables 
retained in the model are not only biased but are inconsistent as well. 
Additionally, the failure in finding FDI spillovers in the earlier panel studies can have resulted 
from other lapses, as for instance, considering either an incorrect specification on the relevant 
technology to be diffused or taking into account the immediate diffusion of technology rather 
than the need of an adjustment lag. In fact, when Aitken et al. (1997), take into account the 
diffusion  of  generic  rather  than  industry  specific  technology,  their  study  detected  the 
occurrence of FDI spillovers: the operation of export oriented foreign firms in Mexico was 
associated with a higher tendency for domestic firms to enter foreign markets. This finding 
highlights  the  potential  positive  effect  on  host-country  manufacturing  of  the  diffusion  of 
foreign generic knowledge about how to export, including information on standards, market 
access and distribution channels. On the other hand, in their study about the impact of FDI on 
domestic productivity, using panel data for the UK manufacturing sector, Haskel et al. (2002) 
actually find evidence of a positive intra-industry effect when a sufficiently spread lag is 
allowed for. This finding illustrates the importance of absorptive capacity to benefit from 
diffusion, even if with a delay.  
The sectoral pattern described above (subsection 2.4) about the impact of FDI on host-country 
industrial organization needs to be empirically tested. So, recently the need to allow for inter-
industry  effects  in  panel  data  studies  was  recognized  by  several  authors.  Since  then,  the 
finding of restricted intra-sectoral spillovers but profuse inter-sectoral effects from FDI via 
backward linkages has been documented for several countries, such as, Indonesia (Blalock, 
2001), Lithuania (Smarzynska, 2004), Mexico (Lopez, 2003) and Zambia (Bwalya, 2006).   24
The  estimation  of  the  extent  of  new  technological  opportunities  for  domestic  producers 
stemming from MNC operations includes potential effects within the sector of the foreign 
firm as well as across other sectors, but these must not be limited to backward linkages. FDI 
affects  domestic  producers  both  directly  through  backward  linkages  to  suppliers,  as 
documented in the papers mentioned above, but it also affects indirectly through enhanced 
input availability (a pecuniary externality). By stimulating upstream sectors, MNCs may also 
benefit other downstream local producers as cheaper inputs become available, as pointed out 
in  the  structural  estimation  framework  specified  in  Kugler  (2006)  to  analyze  Colombian 




3.4.3. Ownership structure 
It is well recognized that sharing possession with a local partner can reveal the ownership 
advantage  of  a  multinational  and,  in  that  way,  give  rise  to  technology  spillovers. 
Consequently, MNCs are frequently confronted with limitations to the ownership structure of 
their  foreign  operation  by  local  governments.  In  particular,  developing  and  transition 
economies often impose joint ownership expecting advantages from technology spillovers. 
MNCs, on the other hand, don’t appreciate such forced international joint ventures, precisely 
because of the risk of involuntary spillovers
19. 
It is also usually assumed that, the larger the risk of spillovers, the less the multinational is 
inclined to transfer technology. So the extent of such technology spillovers depends not only 
on  the  nature  of  the  technology  transferred  but  also  on  the  limitations  imposed  by  host 
country governments and particularly on the ownership structure in the joint venture. Moran 
(1998) shows that FDIs launched under mandatory joint partnerships and licensing requests 
are  less  likely  to  be  integrated  into  the  MNCs'  global/regional  sourcing  and  production 
network — mainly owing to concerns over quality controls, leakage or stealing of the latest 
proprietary  technology,  possible  conflicts  with  partners  over  transfer  prices,  market 
allocations and rationalization of international production. In the meantime, FDIs launched 
under domestic satisfied requests suffer from being non-competitive internationally because 
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spillovers is borne out by the evidence in this paper’. 
19 Such restrictions have been and still are well known in countries like Russia, China, India, Indonesia, the 
Republic of Korea and many others (UNCTC, 1987). Furthermore, in cases of privatization, governments have 
often retained a significant share of the privatized firms (Bortolotti et al., 2004; Maw, 2002).   25
the foreign investors have been forced to substitute more expensive host country goods for 
cheaper  imports—leading  again  toward  production  for  the  host  market.  Being  non-
competitive, these FDI operations typically also operate under heavy import protection, tend 
to be highly inefficient, and unless the domestic market happens to be very large, are also 
unable to achieve sufficient plant size to enjoy scale economies (Lim, 2001). 
These FDI operations — being less efficient, host-market-oriented, and out of the MNCs' 
global production sphere — thus tend to be less dynamic and receive much less attention from 
the  parent  firms,  leading  to  slower  rates  of  new  technology  transfer  and  developmental 
resources.  For  instance,  Mansfíeld  and  Romeo  (1980),  in  a  study  of  31  firms  and  65 
technologies,  find  that  parent  firms  transfer  technology  to  wholly  owned  subsidiaries  (in 
developing countries)  one-third  faster  on average  than  to joint ventures or licensees. Lim 
(2001) illustrates lags in the utilization of advanced management systems, including quality 
control systems and just-in-time inventory control as well as other problems of delays in 
technology  transfer  prevalent  in  Malaysia's  automotive  industry.  Kokko  and  Blomström 
(1995) find that in general the imposition of host country permissions on the behaviour of 
foreign  affiliates  is  negatively  correlated  with  technology  inflows  into  the  host  country. 
Consequently,  spillovers  from  FDI  operations  under  the  above  mentioned  restrictions  are 
likely to be smaller and may even be negative.  
Persuasive case study evidence shows that restrictions imposed by host countries contribute to 
lower the potential benefits of FDI. However despite the credible case study evidence, there 
does  not  appear  yet  to  be  direct  systematic  evidence  that  spillovers  from  wholly  owned 
subsidiaries free of restrictions are greater than those under domestic content requirements or 
those from joint ventures and licensees, mandatory or not. Usually, the empirical studies on 
spillovers do not separate FDI by type of restrictions. However some exceptions exist. 
Among such exceptions, we find the study of Blomström and Sjöholm (1999). These authors 
argue that local participation in international joint ventures makes the existence of spillovers 
possible.  But  this,  in  turn,  reduces  the  incentive  for  MNCs  to  transfer  technology  and 
management  skills.  Accordingly,  they  examined  the  interaction  of  spillovers  and  the 
ownership  structure  in  joint  ventures,  trying  to  answer  two  questions.  Does  minority  and 
majority ownership of establishments matter in terms of productivity levels? Secondly, does 
the degree of spillover differ with the degree of ownership in the FDI? Their empirical results 
confirm that domestic establishments benefit from spillovers in terms of productivity levels 
because foreign establishments have comparable high levels of labor productivity. However,   26
the degree of foreign ownership doesn’t affect either the level of labor productivity in foreign 
establishments,  or  the  degree  of  spillovers.  In  contrast,  Dimelis  and  Louri  (2002)  find 
evidence that the degree of foreign ownership matters, and that productivity spillovers are 
stronger when foreign firms are in minority positions. Similarly, Smarzynska (2004) reports 
positive spillovers from joint ventures with shared ownership in Lithuania but not from fully 
owned foreign investments.  
Müller and Schnitzer (2006) reanalyzed this topic recently. These authors argued that the 
extent of the effective spillover depends not only on the ownership structure but also on the 
transfer  of  technology  and  on  the  host  country’s  policy.  These  latter  factors  depend  on 
country specific and industry-specific determinants. Whether or not a larger ownership share 
of the host country firm leads to more spillovers is a priori not clear and can differ across 
countries and industries. This observation may help explain why the empirical evidence on 
this issue is mixed. Additionally, Müller and Schnitzer (2006) have shown that joint ventures 
may be in the interest of both host country and multinational, even if the multinational cannot 
be directly compensated for giving up part of its cash flow rights. This is the case if the host 
country is induced to support the investment through policy measures. On the other hand, 
there are circumstances where a joint venture is not in the interest of the host country. This 
conclusion should be of particular interest to countries in Central and Eastern Europe and to 
other  transition  countries  where  host  country  governments  often  force  the  sharing  of 
ownership. 
 
3.5. Other determinants of spillover magnitudes 
As we have seen in the previous section, the amount of spillover benefits is dependent on the 
ability and motivation of local firms to interact with, learn from, and invest in, the technology 
and ideas that can be spilt out by the foreign firm. On the other hand, it is usually alleged that 
spillovers will only accrue if technology, knowledge or any other ‘gap’ between foreign and 
local firms is not too large
20. So, two questions arise: Do domestic firms need to possess some 
level of initial productive efficiency to benefit from the presence of MNCs? If FDI spillovers 
exist,  what  does  determine  its  dimension?  The  literature  has  emphasized  the  following 
factors: 
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diffused: specific technologies must have different absorptive requirements from the generic ones.   27
a)  Size  of  the  technology  gap  between  domestic  and  foreign  firms.  Where  there  is  no 
technological  congruence,  that  is,  where  foreign  and  domestic  technologies  are  very 
dissimilar,  there  is  little  scope  for  learning  and  spillovers.  On  the  other  hand,  spillovers 
magnitude appears to depend on the capability of the indigenous firms to ‘absorb’ the foreign 
technology. For instance, Blomström (1986) finds that a foreign presence lowers the average 
dispersion of a Mexican sector's productivity but the effect is more significant in sectors with 
simpler  technology.  Blomström  interprets  this  finding  as  indicating  that  foreign  presence 
forces local firms to become more productive in sectors where ‘best practice technology’ is 
within their capacity. Kokko (1994) and Kokko, et al. (1996) find similar results for Mexico 
and Uruguay, concluding that spillovers are more difficult to identify where foreign affiliates 
have much higher productivity levels than local firms (for instance, as situations like some 
resource-processing enclaves). Similarly, Imbriani and Reganati (1997) show that efficiency 
spillovers for a set of Italian firms are the greater, the smaller the size of the technology gap 
is
21. Balasubramanyam et al. (1996) also find tentative evidence regarding the importance of a 
certain threshold of the host’s human capital. 
b)  Type of host investment climate. A liberal investment climate would tend to generate 
stronger spillovers because it is more likely to attract more dynamic FDI, that is, the one that 
has the desirable attributes: large, with economies of scale and best management practices, 
innovative, and highly efficient Moran (1998). On the other hand, a restrictive investment 
climate with conditions such as mandatory joint partnerships, licensing, or domestic content 
requirements have a propensity to attract less efficient, technologically old-fashioned FDI. 
Identically, Eaton and Gersovitz (1984) show that the threat of nationalization may induce the 
foreign investor to choose an inefficient technology that makes nationalization less attractive 
to the host country. 
c)  The  establishment  of  export-oriented  operations  with  capacity  to  force  a  ‘clustering’ 
effect (Moran, 1998). Usually the export-oriented FDI is tied to the global/ regional sourcing 
and production network of MNCs (with the aim of enhancing the parent firm’s competitive 
position in international markets). By itself, it is in the parent firm’s interest to provide these 
affiliates with newer technology, more rapid technological upgrading, and persistent parental 
supervision in the areas of cost and quality control as well as in the areas of the development 
of managerial/ human resources. Once these export-oriented FDIs are set up, they also tend to 
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appears to be the degree of competition introduced by the MNC. Chen (1983) finds a positive association 
between the speed of technological diffusion and the share of foreign ownership in four Hong Kong industries.   28
attract other foreign investors into the location (in a ‘clustering’ effect). The combination of 
advanced technology, exporting  into competitive world markets, and clustering of foreign 
investor  activity  will then tend to generate substantial spillovers and externalities through 
strong backward linkages to indigenous suppliers
22.  
 
3.6. Is the micro view conclusive? 
As firm-level studies of particular countries (e.g., Germidis, 1977; Aitken and Harrison, 1999) 
fail in finding evidence of positive technology spillovers from foreign firms to domestically 
owned ones, several authors (e.g., Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Harrison, 1996; Aitken et al., 
1997; De Mello, 1997; Carkovic and Levine 2002) are driven to conclude that there are no 
reasons to believe that FDI accelerates economic growth overall. However, this conclusion is 
not indisputable. The failure in finding spillovers at the micro level is not sufficient to discard 
the positive influence of FDI on long-term economic growth. 
The  non-appearance  of  spillovers  in  microeconometric  literature  may  be  due  to  several 
reasons,  from  data  problems  to  specification  or  selection  bias.  For  example,  the  lack  in 
finding spillovers may be due to the fact that the influence of FDI on TFP is the resulting 
effect  of  reallocation  of  resources  and not  the result  of expected technological spillovers. 
Conversely, when technologically more advanced foreign affiliates first enter a market, their 
presence  may  erode  the  market  power  of  indigenous  incumbents  while  simultaneously 
introducing new production techniques and technologies from which these same incumbents 
learn. Real knowledge spillovers can take place, yet their effects may be masked in the data 
by changes in appropriability conditions. Additionally, as we have emphasized in section 2, 
FDI can contribute to productivity growth due to other reasons than technology transfer. 
However, many other difficulties arise. As it is well known, some problems have affected the 
microeconomic  empirical  studies  of  inward  FDI  spillover  effects.  Firstly,  because  data 
problems are particularly acute with regard to service industries, most research on FDI at the 
firm level focuses exclusively on production of material goods, overlooking the effect on the 
productivity  of  services.  This  lack  of  empirical  research  on  FDI  in  the  services  sector  is 
increasingly  troublesome,  owing  to  the  growing  importance  of  services  in  production,  in 
trade, and in investment. Secondly, empirical work on FDI is generally overwhelmed by the 
limited availability and quality of the data. As a result, empirical research on FDI at firm level 
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is largely limited to firms from just a few countries. Furthermore if, as Cantwell (1989) and 
Aitken  and  Harrison  (1999)  argue,  positive  technology  spillovers  do  not  occur  in  all 
industries, the estimates of empirical studies at the firm level may be more or less biased, 
according to the type of industry included in the sample of firms, and its transposition to the 
macro level is likely to enforce the biases.  
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A  number  of  countries  have  policies  that  encourage  or  even  subsidize  multinational 
investment.  Often,  as  has  been  the  case  in  Singapore  and  Malaysia,  these  policies  are 
deliberately biased in favor of multinational firms in technology intensive industries. Such 
preferences are based on the view that production and/or research activities undertaken by 
multinational affiliates within national borders confer spillover benefits. But, in spite of the 
predictions of theoretical models, and current policy arguments, the main conclusion of this 
review of empirical literature is that the only unambiguous result is the superior productivity 
of foreign firms.  
So,  empirical  literature  on  the  occurrence  of  positive  effects  of  inward  FDI  is,  at  best, 
controversial. If, on the one hand, early studies using industry-level data, such as Blomström 
and Persson (1983), find that foreign presence in an industry positively influences domestic 
labor productivity, and the earliest statistical analyses of inter-industry effects of FDI claim 
that technical progress did not only take place in the FDI own industries, but also in other 
sectors (Katz, 1969), on the other hand, some more recent studies using firm-level data are 
less supportive of the existence of positive spillovers. Furthermore some authors, as Aitken et 
al. (1997), Haddad and Harrison (1993) and Djankov and Hoekman (2000), find that foreign 
investment has a negative effect on the performance of domestically owned firms.  
The mechanisms by which FDI may influence productivity are complex. These mechanisms 
suggest that multinational activity will have different effects on different indigenous firms, 
depending on their closeness to a given multinational in the product space and the technology 
space. In principle at least, these differential effects can be measured with sufficiently detailed 
firm, or plant-level data, shedding light on the pathways and mechanisms by which foreign 
firms affect local industries. So, researchers are increasingly focused on identifying specific 
channels in the data. However, the great bulk of productivity assessment relating MNCs with 
host  country  firms  is  an  attempt  to  measure  technology  gaps  and  changes  in  technology   30
usually limited to manufacturing. That is a narrow view of MNCs’ technology advantages, 
which may consist more of their knowledge of world markets or methods of coordinating 
production over many countries (Lipsey, 2002). Furthermore, the most significant part of the 
literature on MNCs emphasizes technology as a driving force for the internationalization of 
the  operations  of  such  firms.  As  powerful  as  technology  might  be  in  driving  the 
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￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿%￿ ￿ - ￿ ! ￿/ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ * ￿ 5 ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
6 *   ￿7 ￿ ￿ ￿   8 * ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ) ￿ "￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿9 "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿￿￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿2￿ 3 ￿￿￿￿ * ￿ 5 ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ : ￿
- ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿￿￿’ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿%￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿￿￿￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
; ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ *   ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿< ￿ = "￿- ￿ * +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
%￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ . ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ > ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿   ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿ ￿￿ ￿   ( ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿" ￿ ￿
￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ . ￿￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 4 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
/ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 5 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ 0 ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ? ￿   ￿ ￿￿  ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ "￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿%￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿￿( ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ! ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ 0 ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿: ￿￿
$ ￿ ￿ ￿ 2 ￿   ￿ ￿￿ ￿   ( ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿ 0 ￿ "￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! @ ￿   ￿ ￿!   +￿ ￿6 ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ * ￿ "￿￿￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿" ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿( " ￿ ￿6 7￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
( " ￿ ￿6 8 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ A ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿: & ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿" ￿ ￿￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ 5 ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿: ￿ ￿
; ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ *   ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿6   ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿%￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ . ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿%￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿￿, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ 5 ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿: 1 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6 *   ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ) ￿ "￿￿￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ 5 ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿: ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ A , ￿ "￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿" ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ( ￿
( ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ 5 ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿: ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿- ￿ ￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿: : ￿
$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿ "+￿ ￿￿   ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿ ￿￿ ￿   ( ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿" ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 5 ￿%￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿%￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿" ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿: ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿- ￿ ￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿: ￿￿
B "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ +￿ "￿￿ ￿ ￿￿   ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿ ￿￿ ￿   ( ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ) ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿: > ￿
3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿￿ ￿ ) ￿ "￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿   "￿   ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿￿￿￿￿ ) ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿: ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ < "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ A ￿ ￿￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿   ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ( ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿5 ￿￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿& ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ""￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿5 ￿￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿￿   ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿ ￿￿ ￿   ( ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 4 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿￿ * ￿ * "￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿
￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿ ￿￿ ￿   ( ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ C ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿# ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ! ￿ ￿. ; ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. 5 ￿< 8 = > ￿7> > < ￿5 ￿￿ * ￿ * "￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ( ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿; ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿5 ￿￿ * ￿ * "￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿   ￿   0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! * 2 "￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿￿ * ￿ 5 ￿￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿: ￿
$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿ "+￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ! ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿￿5 ￿
￿ * ￿ 5 ￿￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
$ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ( ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ) ￿   ￿ ￿ D% ￿ ￿ ￿ A ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ? ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , @ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿￿ ￿. ￿5 ￿￿ * ￿ 5 ￿￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿> ￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ "￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ A ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ B ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿C ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿D ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿￿ * ￿ 5 ￿￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ) ￿   ￿ ￿ D% ￿ ￿ ￿ A ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ "￿￿ ￿+ 9 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿￿ * ￿ 5 ￿￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿> ￿￿
9 "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿6 *   ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿7 ￿ ￿ ￿   8 * ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ) ￿ "￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿5 ￿￿ * ￿ 5 ￿￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿> & ￿
6 *   ￿7 ￿ ￿ ￿   8 * ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ) ￿ "￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿9 "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
%￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 5 ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿5 ￿￿ * ￿ 5 ￿￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿> ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿   ￿ E ￿ 3   ￿ F ￿ * G ￿ /"G   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 6 *   ￿ 7 ￿ ￿ ￿   8 * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ "￿￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿5 ￿￿ * ￿ 5 ￿￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿> 1 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ D￿ ￿ D￿   ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿ 7 ￿ ￿ ) C "D% ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ + 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ . ￿5 ￿￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿> ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ 6 ￿ "’ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 6 *   ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ "￿￿ ￿# ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ : ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 3 ￿" ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ . ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿> ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿ ’ ￿   +￿ ￿6 ￿ ￿ A ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿￿ ￿   ( ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿" ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ . ￿￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿5 ￿￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿> : ￿
￿￿ ￿   ￿ ￿6 ￿ "’ ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6 *   ￿￿ ￿ ) ￿ "￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿( ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
: ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿5 ￿￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿> ￿￿
$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿ "+￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿￿   ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿ ￿￿ ￿   ( ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿# ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. ￿5 ￿￿￿ 5 ￿￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿> > ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿ ￿￿ ￿   ( ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿( ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ( ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿￿￿￿￿ 5 ￿￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿> ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿   ￿ ￿6 ￿ "’ ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6 *   ￿￿ ￿ ) ￿ "￿￿" ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
/ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 0 ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿
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￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿